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ABSTRACT. The proposal that the criminal justice system should focus on
rehabilitation – rather than retribution, deterrence, or expressive denunciation – is
among the least popular ideas in legal philosophy. Foremost among rehabilita-
tion’s alleged weaknesses is that it views criminals as blameless patients to be
treated, rather than culpable moral agents to be held accountable. This article
offers a new interpretation of the rehabilitative approach that is immune to this
objection and that furnishes the moral foundation that this approach has lacked.
The view rests on the principle that moral agents owe it to one another to
maintain the dependability of their moral capacities. Agents who culpably commit
criminal wrongs, however, betray an unacceptable degree of moral unreliability.
Punishment, on this theory, consists in the enforcement of the duties that
offenders have to reduce their own likelihood of recidivism.
How should a moral agent respond to his own moral failure?
Specifically, when a moral agent performs a justly criminalized act,
what should he then do? No doubt he should come clean and confess
that he has broken a just law. No doubt he should recognize that
what he has done was wrong and express regret for having done it.
No doubt he should apologize to his victims and even to the wider
community of citizens. And no doubt he should compensate his
victims for the losses they have incurred, when possible. So much, I
submit, we should take for granted.
What else should he do? The proposition I aim to defend is this:
he ought to take measures that reduce the likelihood that he will act
wrongly again. Rightly disturbed by the manifest unreliability of his
moral powers, he ought to fortify them – to shore up their prospects
for future success. If he does not undertake such an effort to get his
moral house in order, he has failed to take seriously the risks that he
continues to pose to others. A state that curtails his liberty in the
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service of that effort, then, intervenes in his life not to inflict
retributive suffering, nor (at least chiefly) to deter others. Rather, its
aim is to enforce the duties he has to maintain his moral depend-
ability.
The suggestion that the penal system should principally aim at
offenders’ moral reform is not, of course, original. It is regularly
listed as one of the main candidate purposes of punishment. This
makes it all the more surprising that few direct attempts have been
made in contemporary political and legal philosophy to mount a
defense of ‘the rehabilitative ideal’.1 That lacuna has enabled
philosophers and citizens alike to entertain only its caricature,
according to which criminals are viewed as blameless patients in
need of treatment. Rehabilitative approaches have thus been con-
demned as incompatible with a proper view of criminal offenders as
culpable moral agents. Accordingly, such approaches have been
consigned – unfairly – to the theoretical graveyard.
Here I present a new interpretation of the rehabilitative approach
– punishment as moral fortification – that is immune to this criticism
and therefore furnishes the moral foundation that the rehabilitative
approach has heretofore lacked. The theory is allied with prevailing
deontological theories of punishment, which explain punishment’s
permissibility by appealing to the moral duties of criminal offenders.2
It is grounded in an undertheorized but, I will argue, widely pre-
supposed moral truth: agents owe it to one another to maintain the
reliability of their moral capacities, especially when it comes to
compliance with the criminal law. When an agent commits a cul-
pable criminal wrong, however, he demonstrates that he has failed
to maintain his moral capacities to the requisite degree, and his
government secures a moral permission to impose measures to
fortify his sense of justice.
While it is impossible to outline a complete theory of punishment
in a single article, I will defend the view’s plausibility by contrasting
it with prevailing approaches and elaborating its responses to the
1 This term was popularized in Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and
Social Purpose (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). For a catalogue of different possible justifi-
cations for rehabilitation, see Peter Raynor and Gwen Robinson, Rehabilitation, Crime, and Justice (New
York, NY: Palgrave, 2005), Chapter 2.
2 This strategy is at the heart of R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), and Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Duff remarks on this approach explicitly, discussing
Tadros, in ‘Punishment and the Duties of Offenders’, Law and Philosophy 32, 1 (2013): 109–127, p. 110.
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most likely objections against it. The aim is hardly to discredit all
rival approaches to the justification of punishment. Rather, it is to
defend the minimal claim that moral fortification is a sufficient
reason to punish, rendering the view worthy of further scholarly
exploration.
But like much work in political philosophy, the payoff is not
simply of academic concern. Reformers who seek to defend reha-
bilitation in our tough-on-crime age lack a convincing framework
through which to explain and justify their views. The theory out-
lined here aspires to provide the foundations of that framework.
I. MORAL FORTIFICATION, REASONABLE FIRMNESS, AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW
The principle upon which the theory rests finds itself in the unusual
position of being both undertheorized and yet widely accepted. It is
roughly this: all moral agents owe it to one another to maintain the
reliability of their moral capacities. Consider Jones, who regularly
experiences temptations to lash out violently at others when they
irritate him. While he has not yet acted on his temptations, he
reasonably believes that it is only a matter of time until he eventually
does so. He nevertheless does nothing to mitigate these temptations,
such as pursuing counseling, seeking out new associates to help him
reorient his thinking, or making other changes in his lifestyle. In
cases like these, our intuition is plain: he is not taking the matter
seriously, and is accordingly liable to moral condemnation. He owes
it to those he threatens to fortify his sense of justice: to take measures
that increase the likelihood that his moral capacities will operate
effectively.
The idea that agents have what I will call fortificational duties is
presupposed by many of our ordinary moral judgments about
agents’ personal responsibility for living up to moral demands. To
say that Barbara is subject to a duty not to steal from others is not
some obtuse shorthand for the idea that someone else needs to
ensure that Barbara does not engage in theft. Of course not: it means
that Barbara needs to ensure that Barbara does not culpably commit
theft, whatever might be involved in doing so. She must, that is, do
what it takes to realize a state of affairs in which she has not culpably
committed that crime. To succeed, this may involve, inter alia,
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avoiding locations in which objects she is tempted to steal are found;
reflecting on her potential victims’ interests and their value, in the
hopes of generating countervailing desires not to wrong them;
deepening her understanding of why theft is wrong in the hope that
her moral motivation not to steal will be strengthened through such
understanding; and so on.
This example is somewhat contrived, but it illustrates something
familiar about the phenomenology of moral compliance. Doing
one’s duty is often not experienced as a matter of flicking a switch.
There are potential psychological hurdles that agents may well
encounter along the way. And we typically judge that it is the agent
herself who is primarily responsible for overcoming them. Thus our
primary moral duties to perform or refrain from performing certain
acts are, in fact, often accompanied by ‘waves’ of fortificational du-
ties whose fulfillment positions the agent to live up to the associated
primary duties successfully.3 And while it may be rational for citizens
to work together in mitigating the influence of pernicious tempta-
tions, the structure of the duty to self-fortify is, at root, individual.4
In ordinary moral experience, we standardly judge that it is up to
agents themselves to get their primary moral jobs done.
Thus fortificational duties are largely presupposed by our ordi-
nary moral practices. That is a powerful reason to believe in their
existence. Their plausibility is reinforced by the more familiar prin-
ciple that agents ought not to endanger the rights of others without
sufficient justification.5 Activities like speeding in an automobile are
wrongful not necessarily because they violate anyone’s rights, nar-
rowly conceived, but because they increase the likelihood of viola-
tion without justification.6 It is widely believed that we have duties
to manage such external technology appropriately, minimizing the
dangers it poses. But the same reasoning suggests that we should
handle our internal technology appropriately, too – to maintain our
3 For the idea of ‘waves of duties’, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Rights in Conflict’, Ethics 99, 3 (1989): 503–
519, p. 509.
4 Of course, it may be that we also have duties to increase the likelihood of others’ compliance with
morality. I do not defend that more ambitious claim here.
5 This qualification is important: there are plenty of contexts in which it is permissible to impose
risks on others – for example, in practices in which all consent to the risks involved.
6 Alternatively, we might prefer to express this same point by saying that speeding does violate
others’ rights, precisely by risking serious harm.
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own moral capacities with an eye toward circumventing their mal-
function.
We need not embrace the view that agents have duties to fortify
their moral capacities with respect to all moral duties. John Rawls
familiarly distinguishes the first moral power – to identify and be
moved by moral duties of justice – from the second moral power –
concerning questions of the meaning and nature of the good life.7
Now, whether agents even have duties to improve their conformity
with the correct conception of the good life (whatever it might be) is,
on a liberal view, precisely the kind of question that citizens have the
prerogative to figure out for themselves. Our concern here is instead
with the first moral power.
The first moral power has both an epistemic component, con-
cerning the identification of one’s justice-related moral duties, and a
motivational component, concerning one’s compliance with those
duties. The principle that we ought to fortify our first moral power
accordingly enjoins us to guard against two corresponding sources of
moral failure. If I have a tendency to perpetrate epistemic moral failure
– reaching mistaken conclusions about whether certain conduct
qualifies as permissible or wrongful – I ought to take steps to
eliminate that tendency. This may simply be a matter of spending
more time engaged in practical deliberation, or of diversifying my
sources of information, or of asking peers to double-check my
thinking. Sometimes my epistemic failure will concern not simply
the content of morality, but the role of morality. If I have a tendency
to treat moral reasons for action as on par with any other sort of
reason, thereby denying them their typical regulative primacy, I
ought to correct that tendency. The reason why is clear: epistemic
failures surrounding moral matters are often causally upstream of
actual wrongdoing.
Likewise, it is familiar enough that agents sometimes act contrary
to moral duties that they themselves recognize, perpetrating moti-
vational moral failure. In cases in which agents perceive an incon-
gruence between what is prudentially rational and morally required,
people face temptation. Agents have duties to take reasonable steps
to mitigate the influence of such temptations – schooling themselves
out of certain desires, avoiding certain situational triggers, and so on.
7 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 47ff.
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The duty to fortify one’s first moral power surely has ramifica-
tions across political philosophy. Here, however, I shall focus on one
subset of these requirements. Specifically, I shall examine the forti-
ficational duties that attach to our primary duties not to commit
crimes: acts that the legislature of a given jurisdiction have deemed
morally unacceptable and formally declared are ‘not to be done’.8
Here the idea of fortificational duties finds expression not only
within our moral experience, but also in our established legal practice.
Consider a defendant who appears in court, and claims the following
defense for his sizeable bank robbery: he did it because he was over-
whelmed by his desire to become rich, and should accordingly be
excused. Or consider another defendant who lethally poisons her
professional nemesis, thereby securing her own promotion at the of-
fice, and insists she is excused because of the strength of her ambition
for that promotion. The influential Model Penal Code instructs courts
not to take such arguments seriously. The idea that agents can be
‘forced’ by their ordinary criminal temptations into doing wrong – and
so can invoke the excuse of duress – is rejected by prevailing legal
practice. Agents are required to demonstrate ‘reasonable firmness’ in
response to the temptations toward crime that they face.9 If defendants
face temptations to break the law, it is their responsibility to manage
those temptations and prevent themselves from succumbing to them.
That the demand for firmness embodied in our law is only for
reasonable firmness is important. Agents are not obliged to make
themselves resilient against the kinds of psychologically over-
whelming forces that genuinely eviscerate responsibility. An agent
who commits a crime under genuine duress – say, as a loaded pistol
is pointed to her child’s head – is not ordinarily regarded as morally
blameworthy if she commits the crime.10 Such a person cannot be
8 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 6. Here I will
consider both mala in se offenses – acts that are wrongful independent of their prohibition – and mala
prohibita offenses – acts that are wrongful in part because the law prohibits them. Note, however, that
most mala prohibita crimes (such as driving on the left in the U.S.) serve to coordinate compliance with a
background moral principle (such as the duty not to endanger others while operating fast-moving
vehicles). Thus failure to comply with (justified) mala prohibita criminal statutes can constitute genuine
moral failure. I thank a reviewer for raising this issue.
9 Model Penal Code 1985, section 2.09 (1)–(2). The term ‘reasonable firmness’ only arises in con-
nection with the provisions on duress, but the normative principle reflected therein is broadly consistent
with the Code generally. For instructive discussion, see Richard Lippke, ‘Chronic Temptation, Rea-
sonable Firmness, and the Criminal Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 34, 1 (2014): 75–96.
10 Importantly, this example involves duress as an excuse, not as a justification. Note that agents are
typically not legally excused for homicide, even if they are threatened with death – but this is con-
troversial.
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thought to be lacking in reasonable firmness, for it is implausible to
hold that an agent should have taken measures to prepare herself for
moral rectitude in the eventuality of such an occasion. To make
oneself reasonably firm, then, one must ensure that one is prepared
to overcome the kinds of threats to moral rectitude that do not
eviscerate responsibility.11
Fortificational duties explain why our legal commitment to rea-
sonable firmness is appropriate: because agents have responsibilities
to make themselves firm in precisely the way the law expects. But it
is crucial to observe that our legal commitment to reasonable
firmness does not issue any concrete recommendations as to how to
make ourselves reasonably firm. Rather, we simply expect one an-
other, as responsible adults, to get the job done. But why? Why not
issue formal legislative pronouncements that specify what it is, ex-
actly, that citizens should be doing to fortify themselves? Why not
require compulsory sessions with state counselors, checking up to be
sure we are keeping ourselves morally resilient? Why not create a
civic culture in which strangers are continually peeking into one
another’s lives, demanding to know whether they have undertaken
this or that measure to shore up their first moral power?
It is not a moral oversight that we demand reasonable firmness
and yet refuse to permanently curtail citizens’ liberty and privacy to
ensure that demand is met. It reflects a deep conviction: that sane
adults should take responsibility for their own moral resilience.
Coercive interventions by the state to fortify all citizens’ first moral
power would strike us as profoundly objectionable. One powerful
explanation as to why we rightly respond in this way is that such
interventions express serious disrespect for their targets. Unless an
agent has provided compelling grounds to believe that he is a moral
threat, he rightly finds himself insulted if the state treats him as one.
Just as paternalistic policies are objectionable partly because they
hinge on a negative judgment about agents’ ability to make the right
decisions about their own good12 – to exercise their second moral
power well – regular coercive interventions by the state to fortify
citizens’ first moral power would rest, similarly, on a negative
judgment about their prospects of exercising that power successfully.
11 The account here takes no stand on what kinds of threats eviscerate responsibility, only that some
do.
12 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 80.
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In the absence of appropriate evidence that an agent is morally
untrustworthy, it is prima facie wrong for the state to curtail his
liberty and privacy in order to fortify him. So long as the agent’s
actions do not demonstrate moral unreliability, he retains a defea-
sible, respect-based claim against the coercive enforcement of his
fortificational duties by the state. That, anyway, is the sensible
posture suggested by our current moral and legal practice.13
II. THE FORTIFICATIONIST THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
When an agent commits a morally culpable criminal offense, his
action betrays a failure to maintain his moral reliability. He
demonstrates that he has failed to achieve and sustain his reasonable
firmness in the face of the criminogenic pressures he faces in his life.
The presumption of total trust in his moral capacities can no longer
be credibly maintained; he has forfeited his respect-based claim
against state enforcement of the relevant fortificational duties.14
Criminal punishment consists precisely in the enforcement of those
duties: a coercive intervention into the agent’s life to demand that he
reform himself. This, in summary, is the vision urged by the fortifi-
cationist theory of punishment. This section introduces the theory and
answers some preliminary objections to it.
Perhaps in some other possible world, with different sorts of
beings, fortification could be accomplished by picking flowers or
sipping cocktails at parties. But for beings like us, this process of
fortification is a process of hard work: of reflecting on the specific
law one has broken to solidify one’s understanding of its demands; of
undertaking introspection as to why one contravened it; and of
resolving and embarking on certain courses of thought and action to
decrease the likelihood that one will engage in criminal wrongdoing
again – reorganizing one’s life, if necessary, to do so. Unlike the
expressive sentiment of regret for, say, murder – something an agent
can feel instantly – these pursuits really do take time out of one’s
13 For a further defense of this presumption of trust, see R.A. Duff and S.E. Marshall, ‘Benefits,
Burdens and Responsibilities: Some Ethical Dimensions of Situational Crime Prevention’, in Ethical and
Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention, edited by Andrew von Hirsch, David Garland and
Alison Wakefield (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 17–35, p. 29.
14 Any deontological justification of punishment must include an explanation of why the criminal
offender has forfeited her right against the penal treatment. For a defense of this important claim, see
Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment’, Ethics 122, 2 (2012): 371–
393.
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schedule and thereby reduce one’s opportunities for pursuing plans,
projects, and relationships during the time they demand.
What would fortificational punishments actually involve? They
take their cue from certain elements of prevailing rehabilitative ap-
proaches, which transpire at the fringes of the criminal justice system
in most Western democracies. Consider these illustrative examples,
all designed to help offenders get back on their moral feet:
1. The probation order assigned to the citizen convicted of theft,
requiring that he live in a probation hostel, under curfew, where he
will receive regular counseling and support in developing personal
goals on how to reduce reoffending.15
2. The prison sentence assigned to violent criminals requiring that they
attend an intensive ‘12-hours-a-day, 6-days-a-week programme con-
sisting of workshops, academic classes, theatrical enactments, coun-
seling sessions and communications with victims of violence’.16
3. The prison sentence assigned to spousal abusers, removed from anger-
inducing circumstances and enjoined to participate in seminars in
which they partly re-enact and then critically discuss various scenarios
involving abuse – thereby securing a clearer understanding of the
forces that moved them to act wrongly and subsequently generating
plans for how to manage pernicious desires in the future.17
4. The probation order assigned to citizens convicted of alcohol-related
crimes (such as driving under the influence or drunken domestic vio-
15 For a report detailing reduction in recidivism among those assigned to probation hostels (‘ap-
proved premises’), see ‘An Inspection of Approved Premises in Northern Ireland’, published by Criminal
Justice Inspection Northern Ireland November 2013 and available at http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/50/
500620a6-e62f-4eb8-82b3-1c686eff1368.pdf. For general discussion of probation, see Iain Crow, The
Treatment and Rehabilitation of Offenders (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 83ff, and George Mair and Lol Burke,
Redemption, Rehabilitation and Risk Management: A History of Probation (New York: Routledge, 2012).
16 James Gilligan and Bandy Lee, ‘The Resolve to Stop the Violence Project: Reducing Violence in
the Community Through a Jail-Based Initiative’, Journal of Public Health 27, 2 (2005): 143–148, p. 144. As
one author notes, ‘‘participation in this program for as little as four months reduced the frequency of
violent reoffending after leaving the jail by 83%, compared with a matched control group in a con-
ventional jail’. James Gilligan, ‘Punishment Fails, Rehabilitation Works’, The New York Times, December
19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/18/prison-could-be-produc
tive/punishment-fails-rehabilitation-works.
17 R.A. Duff defends this program in Punishment, Communication, and Community, pp. 102–103, 108–
109. For analysis of treatment programs for perpetrators of domestic violence, see Javier Fernández-
Montalvo et al., ‘Impact of a Court-Referred Psychological Treatment Program for Intimate Partner
Batterer Men With Suspended Sentences’, Violence and Victims 30, 1 (2015): 3–15.
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lence), requiring them to submit to daily breathalyzer checks while
strategizing with parole officers on how to avoid reoffending.18
5. Cognitive behavioral therapy assignments for offenders to learn
strategies for avoiding acquiescence to criminal temptation.19
6. Discussion seminars in which offenders are invited to engage in, and listen to,
reflection on topics in moral and political philosophy, with special attention
to the question of why the actions in which they engaged are wrongful.20
7. Sessions in which offenders must listen to testimonials offered by past
victims of crime about how various crimes affected them.21
8. ‘Restorative justice’ sessions in which offenders meet their victims,
sometimes alongside their respective support networks, to hear the
victims’ account of how the crime affected them. They work together
to craft a plan for how the offender should make amends for the crime,
and to set tasks aimed at reducing the likelihood of reoffending.22
9. Sentences to prisons that are designed to be replicas of the outside
world, and that aim to prepare offenders for that world by respecting
all of their rights except freedom of movement, and providing
offenders with substantive access to work, education, and treatment for
substance abuse.23
18 A program of this kind is described in Beau Kilmer et al., ‘Efficacy of Frequent Monitoring with
Swift, Certain, and Modest Sanctions for Violations: Insights From South Dakota’s 24/7 Sobriety
Project’, American Journal of Public Health 103, 1 (2013): 37–43.
19 See David Wilson et al., ‘A Quantitative Review of Structured, Group-Oriented, Cognitive
Behavioral Programs for Offenders’, Journal of Criminal Justice and Behavior 32, 2 (2005): 172–204.
20 See Alan Smith, ‘Locke and Key’, The Guardian, 20 January 2004, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/education/2004/jan/20/furthereducation.uk2, and Daniel de Vise, ‘College student’s
philosophy program brings Plato and Buddha to a Md. prison’, The Washington Post, 1 September 2011,
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-01/local/35273403_1_maximum-security-pris
on-paper-clip-inmates. Sometimes these programs are offered to offenders who have life sentences,
which is perverse, given their proper purpose.
21 Stephen Farrall and Adam Caverley, Understanding Desistance from Crime (New York: Two Penn
Plaza, 2006), p. 53, describing a group program termed ‘A Fresh Beginning’.
22 See Carolyn Hoyle, ‘The Case for Restorative Justice’, in Carolyn Hole and Chris Cunneen,
Debating Restorative Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 14ff. See the discussion of ‘circle sen-
tencing’, in Gill McIvor, ‘Reparative and Restorative Approaches’, in Anthony Bottoms, Sue Rex, and
Gwen Robinson (eds.), Alternatives to Prison: Options for an Insecure Society (Cullompton: Willan Pub-
lishing, 2004), p. 164. See also the canonical defense of ‘reintegrative shaming’, in John Braithwaite (ed.),
Crime, Shame, and Re-integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 69ff.
23 Many Scandinavian prisons, especially Norwegian prisons, operate along these lines. For a
sympathetic description, see Doran Larson, ‘Why Scandinavian Prisons are Superior’, The Atlantic,
September 24, 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/why-
scandinavian-prisons-are-superior/279949/. Only 20% of offenders released from Norwegian prisons
reoffend, compared to 50–60% in the U.K. and U.S; see William Lee Adams, ‘Sentenced to Serving the
Good Life in Norway’, Time, July 12, 2010.
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10. Sessions with counselors in which offenders are enjoined to develop a
proactive narrative of their own identity, and are encouraged to come
to think of themselves as autonomous agents in control of their own
future as they specify concrete plans (and receive education and
training to prepare) for their future relationships and employment.24
11. Community service orders through which offenders must undertake
activity that facilitates reflection on the wrongness of their past con-
duct (for example, an order requiring tax cheats to prepare reports to
distribute to the public on the detrimental consequences of defrauding
the state).25
A state that deprives criminal offenders of their liberty by coercively
mandating attendance at these burdensome programs aims not at
suffering for its own sake, nor (at least primarily) to deter others. It
aims to facilitate morally fortifying experiences for criminal offend-
ers. As these examples clarify, such experiences are not simply a
matter of exposing offenders to philosophical syllogisms. They aim
to cultivate the moral emotions, to put offenders in the shoes of their
past and prospective victims so as to develop their empathetic
capacities, and to help them craft, prepare for, and proactively
implement concrete plans for their future lives.
These potential punishments formalize endeavors that, on my
view, citizens should ideally be undertaking already. Good citizens, I
argued earlier, are regularly on the lookout for ways to reduce their
susceptibility to moral failure. One explanation of why many of us
never find ourselves facing punishment is that we already organize
and maintain our lives in ways propitious for moral success. And so
long as we succeed, we do not give the state any actionable reason to
doubt our reasonable firmness. The ire of the criminal justice system
befalls those who have ignored their fortificational duties, or who
24 This approach is examined by Shadd Maruna, Making Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuilt
Their Lives (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001), Chapters 5 and 6. For a meta-
analysis of studies that broadly shows that education and employment training programs reduce
recidivism, see David B. Wilson et al., ‘A Meta-Analysis of Corrections-Based Education, Vocation, and
Work Programs for Adult Offenders’, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 37, 4 (2000): 347–368.
As the analysis suggests, more research is needed to establish this causal relationship rigorously, as
current programs are largely optional. My argument is that they ought to be compulsory.
25 Anne Worrall, Punishment in the Community: The Future of Criminal Justice (London: Routledge,
2014), Chapters 7 and 8.
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have not discharged them to the requisite degree, and committed
crimes. Criminal wrongdoing triggers the permissibility of these
duties’ enforcement.
The plausibility of the fortificationist theory depends upon its
contention that an agent, by committing a culpable criminal offense,
betrays his moral unreliability and accordingly forfeits his claim to
conduct his fortificational endeavors without state coercion. But why
should we think that commission of a culpable criminal offense is
unique evidence of moral unreliability? That it typically is such
evidence is uncontroversial; a murderer who insists – ‘Don’t worry;
you can rely on me not to murder again’ – cannot ordinarily expect
to be taken seriously. But why not rely on other indicators of future
wrongdoing, such as statistical propensity to commit criminal of-
fenses or worrisome personal behavior?
If the fortificationist theory were justified as part of a broader
consequentialist moral philosophy, it would be, in principle, possible
to license fortificationist coercion of individuals without any refer-
ence to actual choices those individuals have made (e.g., because
they belong to a particular demographic group with higher-than-
average propensity for committing crime). But on a deontological
view, this will not suffice. Depriving agents of their liberty is very
difficult to justify. One way to make such deprivation easier to justify
is to show that an agent could have avoided such deprivation at a
low cost. As T.M. Scanlon notes, all an agent needs to do to avoid
punishment is to do what morality requires him to do: obey legiti-
mate criminal laws.26 But deprivations of liberty undertaken for
reasons wholly unrelated to agents’ actual choices will be, by defi-
nition, impossible to avoid. Thus a system that punishes persons for
reasons unrelated to their choices will be significantly more difficult
to justify. So long as an agent has not committed a culpable wrong,
he retains his respect-based claim against the state that his fortifi-
cational pursuits – his responsibility to maintain his ‘reasonable
firmness’ – remain unenforced.
26 T.M. Scanlon, ‘Punishment and the Rule of Law’, in The Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 230. Cf. Tadros, The Ends of Harm, pp. 170ff.
JEFFREY W. HOWARD
It may be replied that there exist certain culpable choices that appear
to fall short of proper crimes but nevertheless indicate seriously mal-
functioning moral capacities. And so there are: specifically, if persons
have initiated causal processes that they aim to conclude with the
commission of a culpable offense, these choices clearly qualify as cul-
pable malfunctions in moral agency, even if no victim’s right has, strictly
speaking, yet been violated. But that is a feature, not a bug, of the theory,
for such activity is already widely classified as criminal – as belonging to
the category of ‘inchoate crimes’.27 And fortificationists can explain
precisely why it is appropriate to regard such activity as criminal:
undertaking a chain of actions intended to culminate in a crime reflects a
significant failure to be moved appropriately by the value of others.28
Even if we accept that criminal offenders owe it to their fellow citizens
to increase their likelihood of future compliance with the criminal law, as
the theory contends, we may face skepticism about their prospects for
success. Does rehabilitation work? Just as ineffective deterrent measures
would not be justified on a deterrent theory, ineffective fortificational
measures would not be justified according to the fortificationist theory.29
That would not render the theory untrue, for it could simply issue con-
ditional recommendations (e.g., ‘if it is possible for offenders to fortify
27 Here I presuppose the mainstream view that inchoate crimes are, in fact, properly classified as
crimes. For a sophisticated rejection of this view, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, ‘Beyond Crime and
Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible’, Minnesota Law Review
96 (2013): 141–193.
28 Imagine that advances in genetics give us the ability to identify a subset of the population who are
predetermined to commit violent crime. And suppose that an agent – call him Joe – is overwhelmingly
likely to commit a murder unless he works hard to fortify himself (and he knows this). Would it be
justified to subject Joe to coerced fortificational measures before the time of the crime? To be sure, Joe
would have a duty to fortify himself, given that he has excellent reason to believe he poses a threat. But
what if Joe refuses? One position holds that the state should never be in position to know this; we have
powerful reasons, grounded in concerns about privacy and abuse of power, to balk at the idea of a
government database of all citizens’ genetic codes (or, for that matter, mental health records). A second
position insists that even if the state is aware of his genetic predisposition to kill, Joe retains his respect-
based claim to pursue his fortificational efforts unenforced; if he commits murder, he will be punished.
A third position holds that Joe should be subject to a legal requirement to seek out the requisite
fortification (e.g., admitting himself to counseling) and to prove that he has done so. The framework
outlined here, while designed for the context of a society without any such knowledge, could be
rendered consistent with all of these positions. For related discussion, see Stephen J. Morse, ‘Blame and
Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention’, Boston University Law Review 76 (1996): 113–155, esp. pp.
152–154. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this issue.
29 Though it is worth noting that deterrent theorists often simply take for granted that punishments
(of the sort they recommend) will succeed in deterring crime. For example, Tadros simply appeals to his
empirical intuitions about why people are disinclined to commit crime in The Ends of Harm, pp. 281–282,
as noted in Kimberley Brownlee, ‘What are the Duties in the Duty View?’, Jerusalem Review of Legal
Studies 5, 1 (2012): 62–74, p. 65.
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their sense of justice, they ought to do so’.) Still, it would be puzzling to
develop a theory with conditionals unlikely ever to be satisfied. And while
the central burden of this essay is to allay the kinds of philosophical
worries about rehabilitation that have rendered it unpopular in political
and legal theory, it is nevertheless important to address this concern.
Why have faith in fortification? Part of the faith is supplied not by
empirical evidence, but by moral conviction. Insofar as we regard
criminal offenders as moral agents, we must view them as capable of
choosing to reform their lives and to make different choices in the future
than they have made in the past. To deny this – to insist that they are
fated to make the same mistakes again, that they are incapable of
changing their minds about what they should do and act accordingly – is
to suggest that they are not proper moral agents after all. But if they are
not moral agents, then they are not the sorts of beings for whom blame
and punishment can be appropriate responses. For example, many
philosophers believe that psychopaths, in virtue of their defective moral
psychology, are for that reason outsiders to the community of duty-
bearing moral agents.30 If this is so, then a fortiori such offenders simply
lack fortificational duties and so fall outside the framework defended
here. The dangers posed by such non-agents would be tantamount to
those posed by dangerous non-human animals.31
Of course, the fact that fortification is possible does not mean it is
likely. Rehabilitation fell out of favor among penal ideals in the
United States during the 1970s partly because of empirical objections
30 For arguments that psychopaths are not morally responsible for what they do (or at least are
partly excused) see Jeffrie G. Murphy, ‘Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy’, Ethics 82, 4
(1972): 284–298; Ishtiyaque Haji, ‘On Psychopaths and Culpability’, Law and Philosophy 17, 2 (1998): 117–
140; R.A. Duff, ‘Psychopathy and Answerability’, in Responsibility and Psychopathy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), pp. 199–212; and Neil Levy, ‘Psychopaths and Blame: The Argument from
Content’, Philosophical Psychology 27, 3 (2014): 351–367.
31 For the idea of treating psychopaths as wild animals, see Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, ‘Living on the
Edge: The Margins of Legal Personhood’, Rutgers Law Journal 39, 2 (2008): 237–246, pp. 239–240. Note
that if psychopaths are moral agents – say, because they are capable of understanding moral arguments,
despite their limited powers of empathy – then we rightly view them as morally tasked with over-
coming the obstacles that stand between them and moral success. The mere fact that an offender’s
rehabilitative journey may be considerably more difficult than that of other offenders does not exempt
her from the obligation to fortify herself. Moreover, the claim that psychopaths are incapable of any
reform is itself questionable. Research shows that they may be able to learn to activate their empathetic
capacities; Harma Meffert et al., ‘Reduced Spontaneous but Relatively Normal Deliberate Vicarious
Representations in Psychopathy’, Brain 136, 8 (2013): 2550–2562. So part of moral fortification would
involve teaching psychopaths how deliberately to activate their latent empathy. In any case, we must
remember that the mere fact that one is labeled a psychopath by current practices does not mean one is
a psychopath. One study shows that a person’s score on the psychopathy test can vary considerably
based on who administers the test; see Daniel C. Murrie et al., ‘Are Forensic Experts Biased by the Side
That Retained Them?’, Psychological Science 20, 10 (2013): 1–9.
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to existing programs’ effectiveness.32 And clearly some rehabilitative
efforts have often failed to reduce recidivism to the desired degree.33
But if the moral argument I am defending here is right, the task of
ascertaining the best methods of fortification is itself a moral
imperative. The mere fact that we have not yet solved that challenge
is no counterargument. Far greater policy experimentation is re-
quired before skepticism toward rehabilitation is justified. Moreover,
as my examples earlier demonstrated, such experimentation is al-
ready seriously underway, and numerous programs have shown
positive results in reducing reoffending.34
Indeed, the condemnation of past and present rehabilitation schemes
must be taken with quite a few grains of salt, given their context within
seriously unjust institutions. Rehabilitative endeavors, in the hands of far-
from-fully-just states, can be pernicious for two important reasons. First,
it is wrongful to punish citizens who contravene seriously unjust laws.
Attempts to ‘fortify’ gay and lesbian citizens who contravene illiberal
prohibitions of homosexual sex are unjust, and do not qualify as genuine
moral fortification. Likewise, citizens who are victims of distributive
injustice may have a moral permission to disobey certain laws.35 If that is
so, then attempts to ‘fortify’ such citizens would merely be an endeavor
to tranquilize recalcitrant members of disadvantaged social groups, to
force them into compliance with an unjust basic structure.36
Second, even with respect to justly criminalized acts – such as
battery and murder – insisting on rehabilitation as the unique re-
sponse may reflect a failure to understand crime’s social origins. We
should not conflate criminal behavior that is the straightforward
upshot of individuals’ moral failure with crime that, even if blame-
worthy, has a remediable social genesis. It should not be surprising
32 The canonical empirical denunciation of rehabilitative approaches in the American context is
Robert Martinson, ‘What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform’, Public Interest 35
(1974): 22–56. Martinson qualified his rejection in ‘New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution
Regarding Sentencing Reform’, Hofstra Law Review 7, 2 (1979): 243-258.
33 See Peter Raynor and Gwen Robinson, Rehabilitation, Crime and Justice (New York and London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 64ff.
34 For further examples of successful rehabilitation programs, see Doris Layton MacKenzie, What
Works in Corrections: Reducing the Criminal Activities of Offenders and Delinquents (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), esp. Chapters 5, 6, and 7. For an influential defense of rehabilitation in crim-
inological circles, see Francis T. Cullen and Karen E. Gilbert, Reaffirming Rehabilitation, second edition
(Waltham, MA: Anderson/Elsevier, 2013).
35 For this argument, see Tommie Shelby, ‘Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto’, Philosophy &
Public Affairs 35 (2007): 126–160.
36 C.W. Mills, ‘The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists’, American Journal of Sociology 49, 2
(1943): 165–180.
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for rehabilitation to face difficulty in contexts of injustice, in which
citizens may face intense criminogenic pressures.37 Even if modern
punishments were redesigned to fortify, well-designed rehabilitative
schemes could nevertheless face serious countervailing forces, as
rehabilitated offenders return to communities in which crime is
widely perceived as rational. Offenders’ susceptibility to recidivism
depends largely on whether the rehabilitation has or has not enabled
the offender to break free of certain criminogenic forces in his daily
life. The primary response to criminogenic social conditions is to
alter those conditions, not simply to ramp up punishments.
Of course, most punishments today, especially in the United States,
do not remotely fortify, and may even be criminogenic.38 There is a
serious risk that young offenders who would otherwise mature out of
their illegal proclivities may become career criminals simply in virtue
of being stigmatized by their criminal record and left with few support
networks beyond those they develop in prison.39 Part of the pay-off of
the fortificationist theory is that it is capable of explaining – better than
all rival views – why the arguably criminogenic effects of incarceration
are so pernicious: because the penal system may be accomplishing the
opposite of its proper purpose.40
37 There is an active debate in legal philosophy about whether the state lacks the standing to punish
socially deprived offenders in virtue of its role in generating their criminal temptations through unjust
policies. My own view, which I defend elsewhere, is that even those offenders who are ‘set up to fail’ by
state policies are blameworthy and liable to be punished. Even if the state has acted wrongly by making
it more likely for me to join a violent criminal organization that causes the death of innocents, this
neither justifies nor exculpates my violation of others’ moral rights; nor does it exempt the state from its
duty to protect the public by punishing me; see Jeffrey Howard, ‘Moral Subversion and Structural
Entrapment’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 24, 1 (2016): 24–46. An iteration of this debate could be
raised for the question of offenders’ fortificational duties. I see no reason not to take the same stand I
take with regard to primary moral duties: even if the state has acted wrongly by making it more likely
for me to join a violent criminal organization that causes the death of innocents, this neither exculpates
nor justifies my failure to take steps that prevent myself from violating others’ moral rights. (Intriguingly,
however, it may ground the case for assistance, in the form of public funding, of efforts to discharge the
fortificational punishments). For related discussion on the issue of standing, see Duff, ‘Blame, Moral
Standing, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial’, Ratio 23 (2010): 123–140, and Victor Tadros,
‘Poverty and Criminal Responsibility’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 43 (2009): 391–413.
38 See Martin H. Pritikin, ‘Is Prison Increasing Crime?’, Wisconsin Law Review 6 (2008): 1049–1108.
39 It is widely believed that the ordinary ageing process serves to reduce the likelihood of recidivism.
See Michael E. Ezell and Lawrence E. Cohen, Desisting from Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), esp. pp. 259ff. Of course, it does not follow from this fact that an offender, just by dint of youth,
can claim exemption from punishment. An agent who commits a serious criminal wrong cannot
plausibly respond, ‘Don’t worry – I’ll only do this for a few more years and then I’ll stop’. They have an
obligation to put themselves on track toward non-recidivism. Even if they are bound to mature anyway,
they owe it to their fellow moral agents to accelerate that process. I thank an anonymous reviewer for
flagging this issue.
40 See Mark Kleiman, When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009), Chapter 1.
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III. THE CENTRAL CHALLENGE
The fortificationist theory aims to resuscitate the rehabilitative ap-
proach to criminal justice. For that reason, it must answer the most
pressing challenge that has been advanced against that approach: that
it fails to respect criminal offenders as responsible moral agents. This
challenge has been advanced predominantly, but not exclusively, by
retributivists, who celebrate their doctrine as the penal theory that
uniquely succeeds in respecting criminal offenders.41 Our central
challenge, then, is to defend a rehabilitation-based approach in a way
that immunizes it from this criticism. I promised earlier that the
fortificationist theory succeeds in precisely this way. It is now time to
redeem that promise.
The charge that rehabilitative approaches fail to respect offenders
as agents is, I think, best construed as naming a class of objections to
the rehabilitative approach that all fall under this theme. I will
concentrate on four of these objections: firstly, that the theory uses
persons merely as a means to an end; secondly, that the theory is
paternalistic; thirdly, that the theory licenses cruel and unusual forms
of punishment; and finally, the most important objection, that the
theory views offenders as blameless patients to be treated, rather
than culpable moral agents to be condemned. I take each in turn.
Note that my aim is not to demonstrate that any rehabilitative
theory can answer these objections. Rather, the aim is to explain
why the fortificationist theory in particular is not vulnerable to them.
Firstly, one of retributivism’s most familiar objections to penal
regimes that aim at general deterrence is that they manipulatively
harm agents in order to achieve beneficial results. Since it is prima
facie wrong to harm agents manipulatively – as a means to some
greater good – deterrence theory (in its consequentialist guise) vio-
lates a basic deontological side-constraint. Retributivists have levied a
similar complaint against rehabilitative approaches: they coerce
41 The canonical denunciation of rehabilitative approaches finds expression in Herbert Morris,
‘Persons and Punishment’, The Monist 52, 4 (1968): 475–501, and in the work of Jeffrie Murphy,
specifically his ‘Marxism and Retribution’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 2, 3 (1973): 217–243, pp. 242ff, and
Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (New York: Springer, 1979), pp. 151ff. See also Michael Moore, Placing
Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 85ff, and for a non-
retributivist attack on the rehabilitative ideal animated by similar concerns, see Duff, Punishment,
Communication, and Community, pp. 8ff.
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offenders for the sake of achieving a benefit for others (namely,
greater safety).42
Deterrent theorists of a deontological stripe have a ready answer
to this objection: one way it can be permissible to use someone as a
means is if that person has a duty to be used in that way. Victor
Tadros has recently argued, for example, that wrongdoers have
duties to compensate their victims by protecting them from future
harm by others, which they can accomplish by being punished.43
Clearly it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to adjudicate whether
he is right about that specific claim. My point is simply that the
fortificationist theory helps itself to a structurally similar reply: if
criminal offenders have duties to undertake burdensome fortifica-
tional assignments, as I have argued they do, we do not necessarily
wrong them when we enforce those burdens.
Secondly, some have criticized rehabilitative approaches on the
grounds that they are paternalistic44: they objectionably coerce indi-
viduals for the sake of their own good. For those who justify reha-
bilitation on the grounds that it makes offenders better off, this is a
serious objection.45 But the fortificationist theory is immune to it. It
is immune because it denies that the purpose of fortification is to
help offenders to live better lives. Rather, the point of fortification is
to improve offenders’ conformity with their duties of justice.
It is true that the process of moral fortification may leave the
offender better off, in certain respects, than he was before. After all,
many reasonable conceptions of the good are bound to hold that a
good life includes the fulfillment of one’s duties of justice. Yet this is
not a unique issue for the fortificationist theory. If retributivism were
true, and thus if offenders had public duties to receive their deserved
suffering, many would doubtlessly conclude that the suffering was,
in one sense, good for them: it enabled them to satisfy a duty of
justice they owed to others. But that incidental fact would not
therefore render retributivism a paternalistic doctrine. So it goes for
the fortificationist theory, as well.
42 See, e.g., Moore, Placing Blame, p. 85.
43 Tadros, The Ends of Harm, pp. 273ff.
44 Deirdre Golash, The Case Against Punishment (New York: New York University Press, 2005),
pp. 123ff; Morris, ‘Persons and Punishment’, p. 122; Moore, Placing Blame, p. 86.
45 Edgardo Rotman, ‘Do Criminal Offenders Have a Constitutional Right to Rehabilitation?’, The
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 77, 4 (1986): 1023–1068.
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Thirdly, consider the objection that rehabilitative approaches
authorize cruel and unusual punishment. There are two versions of
this objection. The first is that the theory licenses disproportionately
harsh punishments.46 Now, the question of proportionality in pun-
ishment is a complex one; books that develop theories of punishment
typically devote whole chapters to the matter.47 Thus the answer I
offer here to this complaint must regrettably take a synoptic form,
offering only a glimpse of what the full response would involve.
What the fortificationist relies on is the familiar idea that it is per-
missible to interfere with an agent’s liberty only to the degree for which
the agent has made himself liable. Liability depends, inter alia, on the
magnitude of the threat that the interference is aimed at averting.48 Here
the crucial question concerns the specific type of moral unreliability that
the fortificational punishment aims to correct. If a citizen has proven
himself unreliable with respect to the primary duty not to kidnap and
murder children, this is a far more serious kind of unreliability than that
demonstrated, say, by stealing a piece of chewing gum. The fortifica-
tional work to make oneself morally reliable with respect to the former is
significantly morally weightier than with respect to the latter, and thus
licenses greater interference. The fortificationist approach to punish-
ment is utterly non-revisionist in this sense: morally graver crimes
trigger the appropriateness of more onerous punishments.49
Of course, it is also true that someone who commits a morally graver
crime than another person evidences a more serious malfunction in her
moral capacities – which may take much more work to repair than in the
case of minor malfunctions. But this empirical claim is not what is driving
the normative determination of what counts as maximal permissible
punishment. It cannot drive the normative analysis, since there will be
46 Jean Hampton, ‘The Moral Education Theory of Punishment’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 13, 3
(1984): 208–238, pp. 232ff; Morris, ‘Persons and Punishment’, p. 484.
47 For example, see Tadros, The Ends of Harm, Chapter 15, and Duff, Punishment, Communication, and
Community, Chapter 4.
48 For discussion of liability in the context of self-defense, see Jeff McMahan, ‘The Basis of Moral
Liability to Defensive Killing’, Philosophical Issues 15, 1 (2005): 386–405. Cf. Jonathan Quong, ‘Liability to
Defensive Harm’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 40, 1 (2012): 45–77. See also Tadros, The Ends of Harm, pp.
336ff.
49 By ‘morally graver’, I refer to the blameworthiness of the crime, not the wrongness of the crime.
Crimes that are equally wrong may be differentially blameworthy, due to the presence of mitigating or
aggravating factors, and so merit differential punishment. Certainly, someone who kills a racist
provocateur in a bar brawl, and then is extraordinarily apologetic afterward, should receive less for-
tificationist intervention than someone who kidnaps and murders a child for fun, even though they’ve
perpetrated the same wrong: the violation of someone’s right to life.
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exceptions to this general tendency; someone with an abnormal psy-
chology may require quite a lot of fortification to tame her desire to steal
chewing gum. Yet we should not license the same deprivation of her
liberty as if she were a murderer; that would be clearly unjust. One
implication of this position is that once an offender has hit the ceiling of
maximal permissible punishment, she is entitled to go free (e.g., leave
prison, be relieved of her probation requirements, etc.) even if officials are
reasonably uncertain of whether she has achieved her fortificational goals.
But unless we are prepared to countenance ongoing punishment of
offenders until the state believes certain goals are reached – which could,
in principle, license life imprisonment for minor criminals – this is
unavoidable.50 If a released offender commits a crime again, she will
simply be arrested and prosecuted again, as is presently our practice.51
50 This poses a particular worry in relation to offenders regarded as extremely dangerous, but this
worry is not at all unique to the fortificationist theory; all views must confront the fact that once an
offender has served her proportionate sentence, he is entitled to go free, even if he may continue to
pose a threat to others. On this point, the fortificationist theory has an advantage, since unlike other
theories, at least it insists that punishment focus productively on decreasing the likelihood of recidivism,
rather than simply inflict suffering and then hope for the best. I set aside the question of whether some
crimes may be so heinous that it becomes permissible to interfere with the agent’s rights on an ongoing
basis; Duff suggests that a point may come at which an offender, despite being ‘fully responsible’ for his
crimes, forfeits his claim to remain part of the moral community and may be liable to permanent
imprisonment. See his ‘Dangerousness and Citizenship’, in Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik (eds.),
Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: Essays in Honor of Andrew von Hirsch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998):
141–163, p. 141. Of course, an offender who cannot help but engage in heinous crimes is perhaps not
plausibly regarded as a moral agent at all, and so falls outside the purview of the theory of punishment;
he may have to be treated as possessing a mental illness. This raises deep issues about the nature of
moral agency that go far beyond what we can adjudicate here. For instructive discussion on the issue of
dangerous offenders in the context of theories of punishment, see Richard Lippke, ‘No Easy Way Out:
Dangerous Offenders and Preventive Detention’, Law and Philosophy 27 (2008): 383–414.
51 Should repeat offenders receive more demanding punishments? One attractive possibility is to
give first-time offenders lenient punishments that fall beneath the ceiling of maximal permissible
punishment, and increase the severity with every re-offence until the ceiling is hit. The rationale would
be that individuals could well accomplish their fortificational goals in less time than it would be
permissible to demand, and so, in a spirit of hope, first-time offenders are given the chance to get back
on their feet sooner. This is particularly appropriate for remorseful offenders, who likely require less
fortification, and young offenders, who have a tendency to mature out of criminal tendencies. If they
reoffend, it will illustrate that this hope was unwarranted, and a more demanding punishment (still
under the ceiling) will be appropriate. For a retributivist version of this proposal, see Andrew von
Hirsch, ‘Proportionality and Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Further Reflections’, in Julian V. Roberts
and Andrew von Hirsch (eds.), Previous Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014): 1–16. One argument for why repeat offenders should receive greater
punishment involves an insight at the heart of the fortificationist theory: specifically, such offenders
have failed to reorganize their lives in a law-abiding direction, and this omission is an additional wrong
for which they must receive retributive punishment. This argument is defended by Youngjae Lee,
‘Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert’, in Previous Convictions at Sentencing, pp. 49–71, and
‘Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account’, Texas Law Review 87, 20 (2009): 1–51. Lee does not,
however, argue that the purpose of punishment is rehabilitation; he merely holds that retributive
punishment should be increased for repeat offenders since they are more blameworthy in virtue of
failing to rehabilitate themselves.
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The next version of this objection is the worry that rehabilitative
approaches would license intuitively heinous forms of punishment.
When Jean Hampton criticizes rehabilitative approaches, for exam-
ple, she takes as a model a Connecticut program in which child
molesters were electrically shocked while forced to look at images of
nude children.52 She continues, arguing that if punishment is
understood as a form of treatment, we can expect disastrous results:
‘If the psychiatric ‘‘experts’’ decide that powerful drugs, shock
treatments, lobotomies or other similar medical procedures are
legitimate and necessary treatments of certain criminals, why
shouldn’t they be used?’53 In such a world, Deirdre Golash adds, a
criminal offender becomes ‘a dog to be trained’, rather than an
‘autonomous human being’,54 or, as Herbert Morris adds, one of
many ‘animals who must be conditioned’.55
There is, to be sure, some support for this interpretation in
rehabilitation’s history. While the earlier tradition of rehabilitation,
beginning in the eighteenth century, centered on the use of prisons
to facilitate moral reflection, its updated forms in the first half of the
twentieth century drew inspiration from modern psychotherapy and
social work schemes.56 This update was largely productive, but not
entirely. A lack of philosophical acuity on the part of the scientific
community’s defenders of rehabilitation made the movement easy
prey for retributivist philosophers.57 Some defenders even suggested
that criminal offenders are blameless, and so do not deserve to be
treated as responsible agents.58
A failure to place rehabilitation on solid theoretical grounding led
to a failure among its own defenders to distinguish adequately be-
52 For discussion of that program, see David J. Rothman, ‘Behavior Modification in Total Institu-
tions’, Hastings Center Report 5, 1 (1975): p. 22. This is discussed in Hampton, ‘The Moral Education
Theory of Punishment’, p. 222n.
53 Ibid., p. 222.
54 Golash, The Case Against Punishment, p. 127.
55 Morris, ‘Persons and Punishment’, p. 487.
56 For a comprehensive review of the history, see Peter Raynor and Gwen Robinson, Rehabilitation,
Crime and Justice (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 32–77.
57 See the argument in Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (New York: Viking Press, 1968),
especially at pp. 204ff. Menninger’s argument is lambasted in Murphy, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy,
pp. 149ff.
58 See, e.g., Seymour Halleck, ‘Responsibility and Excuse in Law and Medicine: A Utilitarian Per-
spective’, Law and Contemporary Problems 49, 3 (1986): 127–146, p. 140. For criticism of Halleck’s account,
see Kathryn N. Jackson, ‘Punishment as Therapy: A Reply to Halleck’, Law and Contemporary Problems
49, 3 (1986): 147–159.
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tween approaches that empowered offenders as moral agents – that
fortified their moral powers – and those that bypassed them. Moral
fortification operates by increasing the likelihood that agents will
grasp and be appropriately moved by their moral reasons for action.
The fortificationist theory does not enjoin non-fortificational ways of
shoring up legal compliance. When the character Alex in Anthony
Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange is conditioned so that he experiences
incapacitating nausea every time he considers acting violently
against others, his sense of justice has not been fortified, but by-
passed.59 The problem with the conditioning Alex receives is not
that it deprives him of his freedom of what to think – he retains the
reflective capacity to affirm convictions60 – but that it fails to attend
to the actual root of the problem: Alex’s attitudes toward his fellow
human beings. He is moved to refrain from violating others’ rights
simply because he is averse to feeling ill – not because he has
grasped, and effectively been moved by, an appreciation of others’
value.61
Consider now the final objection motivated by the thought that
rehabilitation disrespects criminal offenders. It is put best by Herbert
Morris, when criticizing what he terms ‘the therapy model’ of
punishment. He argues that this model conceives of wrongdoing as
‘a symptom of some pathological condition in the way a running
nose is a symptom of a cold’.62 Morris continues: ‘Therapy is nor-
mally associated with compassion for what one undergoes, not
resentment for what one has illegitimately done’.63 At the heart of
Morris’s objection is a normative aversion to diagnosis: to a penal
theory that endeavors to identify what, exactly, moves criminals to
commit crime. Francis Allen rightly notes that a key tenet of reha-
bilitative approaches is the idea that ‘human behavior is the product
of antecedent causes’.64 But it is this very tenet, Morris contends,
59 Anthony Burgess, A Clockwork Orange (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972).
60 See the instructive discussion in Rodger Beehler, ‘Containing Violence’, Ethics 92, 4 (1982): 647–
660.
61 Here I have condemned biological and psychochemical treatments that do not accomplish for-
tification. But I have deliberately taken no stand on medical interventions that sharpen human beings’
capacities for moral reasoning, or remove pathological urges that compromise agents’ moral motiva-
tion. For a non-penal discussion of this issue, see Ingmar Persson and Julian Savalescu, Unfit for the
Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Chapter 10.
62 Morris, ‘Persons and Punishment’, p. 480.
63 Ibid., p. 483.
64 Francis Allen, ‘Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal’, in Michael Tonry (ed.), Why Punish?
How Much? (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 97.
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that renders such approaches disrespectful. On this view, to invoke a
causal story of how an offender was moved by ‘forces’ to do this or
that is incompatible with seeing him as a responsible being who has
freely chosen to do what he has done.
This presupposition, however, is false. It is perfectly possible to
condemn an agent for performing a wrongful action while simul-
taneously offering an explanation as to why he chose to perform that
action (e.g., because he was responding to certain incentives or
temptations). Here we tread into deep questions of philosophy about
how exactly to describe the relation between our first-personal
perspective as agents and the third-personal view of persons as
determined by antecedent causes. But we need not settle such vexed
questions – surely the most difficult and fundamental of all65 – to
embrace the highly intuitive, even commonsensical view upon
which the fortificationist theory is predicated: that people are sus-
ceptible to bad influences that get in their way of choosing to do
what is right. Only if causal explanations are meant to excuse – and in
the vast preponderance of cases, they clearly do not – are they
incompatible with blame. Indeed, from the perspective of a criminal
offender who rightly seeks moral improvement, the appropriate
orientation is precisely to accept blame, and simultaneously to get to
work reducing the likelihood that he will fail again. Warm-hearted
remorse, and the clinical resolve to diagnose and remove obstacles to
future moral success, should go together.
Thus the quest to identify the source of wrongdoing is not merely
palatable in the hands of the fortificationist theory, but wholly
appropriate. Punishment should reckon productively with the causal
forces that subverted successful moral decision-making. For, if agents
are themselves responsible for managing the forces that threaten to
interfere in the operation of their moral powers – as our ideal of
moral fortification attests they are – then our insistence that criminal
offenders undertake such proactive efforts is precisely what treating
them as responsible agents involves.
65 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), especially
pp. 110–137.
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IV. DISTINGUISHING FORTIFICATION
Fortificationists are allied with communicative and deterrent theo-
rists in offering an alternative to the retributive idea that wrongdoers
deserve to suffer. By clarifying where exactly it aligns with and
departs from prevailing versions of these views, we can draw
attention to the fortificationist theory’s distinctive advantages.
Fortification vs. Communication
The fortificationist theory develops an insight at the heart of pre-
vailing communicative views of punishment: that punishment
should productively engage offenders’ moral faculties. It is the
newest member of a large family of theories oriented around
expressive, communicative, and educative ideals. Prevailing mem-
bers of that family, however, suffer from a range of difficulties that
have rendered them less popular in penal theory than their
retributivist and deterrent counterparts. The fortificationist theory
retains the spirit of these theories while correcting for their draw-
backs.
According to one of Jean Hampton’s influential articles, the
central aim of punishment is to teach criminal offenders – and the
broader public – right from wrong. However, Hampton’s view
suffers from three difficulties that the fortificationist theory avoids.
Firstly, Hampton employs a strikingly indirect method to teach
offenders right from wrong: inflicting pain. Contending that ‘[p]un-
ishments are like electrified fences’, Hampton asserts that while
animals are simply conditioned by electrified fences, ‘a human being
will be also be able to reflect on the reasons for that fence’s being
there’.66 But it is not clear why we ought to think that this method
will actually facilitate moral education, rather than anger and frus-
tration. The fortificationist theory, in contrast, unmysteriously and
parsimoniously aims directly at moral improvement. Secondly,
Hampton’s theory presupposes that criminal wrongdoing is best
understood as traceable to failures of moral understanding. But in
many instances, criminal wrongdoing is the result of acquiescence to
forces in the offender’s life that motivate the commission of conduct
66 The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, p. 212
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that he himself regards as wrongful.67 Unlike this theory, the forti-
ficationist theory acknowledges that the real work in reducing crime
resides in overcoming particular psychological and social obstacles.
Hampton’s theory, rather than reckon productively with such forces,
prefers instead simply to inflict suffering and then hope for the best.
Finally, while Hampton’s view explains why it might be desirable to
punish offenders – because it could potentially help them see right
from wrong – it does not explain why it would be permissible to do
so.68 In contrast, the fortificationist theory justifies the imposition of
fortificational measures by appealing to the moral duties that
offenders have to submit to them.69
The fortificationist theory is closer to R.A. Duff’s influential
communicative theory of punishment. According to Duff, the
infliction of burdens on offenders serves, firstly, to communicate the
state’s blame to wrongdoers; and secondly, to serve as a ‘secular
penance’ to be embraced by the offender as an intrinsically appro-
priate way to communicate apology to her victims and the wider
political community.70 Duff’s theory faces the challenge of explaining
why the imposition of burdens is necessary for each of these steps.71
Why is it necessary to subject someone to some burden in order for
him to know he is being blamed? The theory’s response is that
offenders could easily ‘ignore or forget a conviction or a purely
symbolic punishment’.72 Yet the existence of immediately repentant
67 For exploration of these obstacles, see Farrall, Rethinking What Works With Offenders, pp. 85ff.
68 The same problem arises for other views in this tradition, such as the aforementioned Braith-
waite, Crime, Shame, and Re-integration; while it offers an account of how to bring an offender back into
the moral community, it does not explain why it would be permissible to coerce her to do it.
69 Hampton ultimately renounced moral education theory and became a defender of retributivism;
see her ‘Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution’, in The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in
Moral and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 108–150.
70 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, pp. 75–130.
71 See Matt Matravers, ‘Duff on Hard Treatment’, in Rowan Cruft, Matthew H. Kramer, and Mark
R. Reiff, Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), Chapter 3.
72 Duff, Trials and Punishments, pp. 260–261. This response is endorsed by most expressivists.
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offenders belies this claim, which is why the theory must rely on a
second explanation for the appropriateness of hard treatment.73 But
it is also unclear why the offender’s expression of apology needs to
be done through burdensome processes, either. To be sure, under-
taking burdensome work is a way of expressing one’s apology; but if
the expression of sincere remorse and apology is the aim, as it surely
must be, the enforced character of such punishments would make it
virtually impossible to know whether offenders really were sorry or
not.74
The fortificationist theory avoids the pitfalls that Duff’s theory
faces. It does not rely on the idea that punishment is necessary to
communicate blame. It does not seek an aim – heart-felt apology
– that is compromised by punishment’s coercive character. And
perhaps most importantly, it explains unmysteriously why an
immediately repentant offender should still be punished. Even if
someone is immediately sorry for what he has done, and even if
the victim immediately accepts the apology, the task of fortifica-
tion – of reorienting one’s character and life in ways propitious
for future moral compliance – is seldom a matter of forming a
single belief and uttering an accompanying speech-act. The of-
fender’s crime has betrayed his moral unreliability, and his fellow
citizens have a right to be sure that he take measures to mitigate
that unreliability.
Importantly, Duff endorses many of the same penal assignments
that the fortificationist theory enthusiastically champions, believing
them to be ideal methods for facilitating blame and apology.75 These
assignments are sometimes constructively pursued in the context of
prison, but this need not be the case; the theories agree that incar-
ceration is a dramatically overused form of punishment, and that
community-based sentences are often far more promising ways of
facilitating communicative apology or moral fortification. In prac-
tice, then, the fortificationist and communicative theories are close
73 Cf. Jean Hampton, ‘The Retributive Idea’, in Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton (eds.), Forgiveness
and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 128–129; Joel Feinberg, ‘The Expressive
Function of Punishment’, The Monist 49, 3 (1965): 397–423.
74 Duff is well aware of this challenge, but he holds that the communicative ritual has value even
when coerced. This reply, however, is controversial; see Kimberley Brownlee, ’The Offender’s Part in
the Dialogue’, in Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility, Chapter 4. While this challenge is not in-
surmountable for the communicative theory, it is a disadvantage that the fortificationist theory lacks.
75 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, pp. 102–103, 108–109.
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allies in advocating for similar policy reforms, which focus on giving
offenders positive tasks to complete.76 But the fortificationist theory
offers a significantly more straightforward explanation of why such
programs are appropriate: not because their burdensomeness con-
stitutes an intrinsically appropriate penance, but because such
offenders have duties to get their moral act together.
Fortification vs. Deterrence
Alongside deterrence theory, the fortificationist theory avows that
punishment’s central justifying aim is the prevention of crime. The
prospect of the penal system’s abolition would disconcert us,
defenders of deterrence and moral fortification agree, not because it
would make it harder to give wrongdoers their due suffering. Rather,
it is because it would make people less safe.77 Where the fortifica-
tionist theory innovates, departing from those views, is in its account
of crime prevention’s proper modus operandi.
At the heart of the distinction I have in mind are two competing
pictures of how a legal order ensures its citizens’ compliance. The
idea of reasonable firmness we analyzed earlier suggests one such
picture: citizens take responsibility for managing their own tempta-
tions toward wrongdoing, aspiring to comply with the criminal law
on the basis of their moral capacities’ successful operation. When
they slip up, limited coercive interventions by the state aim to return
them to the fold. The rival picture is one of continual mass coercion:
it is a matter of what H.L.A. Hart, criticizing John Austin, called ‘the
76 Both theories thus face the challenge of explaining what to do when an offender refuses to comply
with her fortificational or communicative assignments. Even if an offender is physically arrested and
brought to her assignments – or even if her assignment requires that she live in a secure facility – there
is always a worry that she will refuse to engage. What should happen under such circumstances?
Supposing that the sentence initially given to the offender was lower than the maximal permissible
punishment, the state is, at the very least, permitted to respond to the non-cooperative conduct by
increasing the severity of punishment until it hits the ceiling of permissible punishment. For example, if
the initial sentence involves a community service order and the offender fails to cooperate, it could be
permissible to impose a prison sentence in response to the noncompliance – thereby placing the
offender in a more intensive environment that could potentially spark greater engagement. Beyond this,
we might regard the failure to cooperate as a distinct moral wrong – a failure of the citizen to comply
with a legal requirement – thus triggering the permissibility of additional fortificational punishment.
Here I have learned from Duff’s instructive discussion of non-compliance in Punishment, Communication,
and Community, p. 152. For policy discussion on non-compliance, see Rob Canton, ‘Yes, No, Possibly,
Maybe: Community Sanctions, Consent, and Cooperation’, European Journal of Probation 6, 3 (2014):
209–224.
77 This point is made well in Tadros, The Ends of Harm, p. 89. Of course, the abolition of the trial and
conviction process would also disconcert us because it would constitute a failure to affirm support for
the moral status of victims.
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gunman situation writ large’.78 On this approach, mass legal com-
pliance is secured through threats continually issued by the state
against its citizens. Moral fortification secures compliance through
bolstering citizens’ first moral power; deterrent threats secure
compliance by bypassing that power.
We have reasons to prefer the fortificationist approach to legal
compliance over the deterrent approach. First, it belongs to our own
moral self-understanding as agents that we ought to live up to our
duties of justice for the right reasons. For me to respect someone is
to be moved by a proper appreciation of her value – by the attitudes
that her value rightly inspires. To depend upon deterrent threats to
do what is right – say, to refrain from murder – reflects a failure to
be moved in the way that moral agents ought to be moved. Second,
it belongs to our proper understanding of others that they ought to
live up to their duties of justice for the right reasons. By structuring
our institutions in ways that communicate faith in one another’s
capacity to act for the right reasons, we express respect to others.79
But by insisting that the government continually attach deterrent
threats to its laws, and educating children to view the legal system as
conducted accordingly, we risk disrespecting one another, and in-
deed creating a lamentable kind of public culture. As Hegel put the
point: ‘To justify punishment in this way is like raising one’s stick at
a dog; it means treating a human being like a dog instead of
respecting his honour and freedom’.80 We should, at the very least,
be wary of installing such threats as enduring, prominent compo-
nents of our civic infrastructure.81
Arguably, prevailing legal practice mixes the two pictures I have
painted. We attach deterrent threats to our laws, and then we still
expect those threats’ addressees to demonstrate reasonable firmness
in response to temptations they face to act wrongly. That observa-
tion helps us see two important points. The first is that even those
who embrace deterrence tend to regard it as insufficient for legal
78 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1961] 1994), p. 7.
79 A similar point is made by Jane Mansbridge, ‘Altruistic Trust’, in Mark E. Warren (ed.), Democracy
and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 295.
80 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, translated by T. Knox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
[1821] 1942), p. 246.
81 This argument on the disfiguring effect of deterrent threats is made most famously by R.A. Duff,
Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 151–186, and Punishment,
Communication, and Community, pp. 75–79, 82–88.
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compliance. Agents who face temptation must take seriously the
possibility that threats will be insufficient to motivate them.
The second point suggested by prevailing practice is this. Nothing I
have said precludes the possibility of a synthesis between fortifica-
tionist and deterrent approaches.82 Whatever our regrets might be
about deliberately erecting a system of deterrent threats, it may well be
that the prospect of fortificational punishment would result in deter-
rent side-effects. Fortificationist punishment is, after all, punishment: it
involves the deprivation of liberty for those involved. Even offenders
who are motivated to pursue moral fortification – say, because they are
immediately repentant and are desperate to get back on their moral
feet – are still subjected to treatment that would otherwise qualify as a
violation of their rights. Moreover, the content of the activities that
offenders are coerced to perform is burdensome.83 That is a reason for
thinking that fortificational punishments are not anything that citizens
would rush to make themselves eligible for.
Whether a fusion of moral fortification and deterrence is desirable
is a question for another day. Certainly, the claim that fortification is
a sufficient reason to punish is wholly compatible with the distinct
claim that offenders have duties to protect their victims from future
crimes committed by others84; nothing I have said here suggests
otherwise. Note, however, that if the fortificationist theory succeeds,
it is not necessary to offer an additional theory to justify any general
deterrent side-effects of fortificational punishments. If offenders have
duties to their fellow moral agents to submit to fortificational pun-
ishments, then they are not being used merely as a means if publi-
cizing their punishments also serves to deter others.85
82 Duff observes the same with regard to his theory in Punishment, Communication, and Community, p.
85. Tadros briefly suggests that punishment could facilitate rehabilitation while simultaneously
accomplishing general deterrence in The Ends of Harm, p. 356. (On Tadros’s view, however, rehabili-
tation is justified by the goal of benefitting offenders – making their lives go better. The fortificationist
theory has no such goal.) In principle, there could even be a fusion between the fortificationist theory
and retributivism; I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
83 Note that even if that were not so – even if fortification were a genuinely enjoyable experience –
it would still be appropriate to describe the fortificational assignments as punishments, since they
involve an authoritatively imposed restriction on liberty in response to wrongdoing. Even if fortification
were best pursued by sending offenders to luxury resorts, where they could reflect on their wrongdoing
in peace, the fact that they had no choice over the matter is sufficient to establish that such treatment
would qualify as punishment: it would, in other contexts, be classified as a rights-violation.
84 Tadros, The Ends of Harm, Chapter 12.
85 While a full development of a hybrid fortificationist/deterrent theory is beyond the scope of the
present article, its possibility helps allay the fears of those who believe that some persons, despite being
full moral agents, are nevertheless highly unlikely to be moved by moral considerations, and may
require additional prudential reasons in order to be legally reliable.
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V. CONCLUSION
The fortificationist theory aspires to unite the best of prevailing
approaches while setting aside the worst. Like communicative ap-
proaches, it insists that the punishment should engage offenders’
moral capacities, but it does not rely on controversial notions of
penance. Like retributivism, it insists on holding criminal offenders
accountable as moral agents, but it does not invoke the sectarian idea
of deserved suffering in doing so. Like deterrence theory, it insists
that a central point of criminal punishment is to prevent future
crime, but its technique of crime prevention is insistently individu-
alistic, demanding that offenders take seriously what they have done
and resolve to do better in the future.
In foregoing the drawbacks of prevailing approaches, the fortifi-
cationist theory aspires to vindicate a point of deep common sense:
that people who violate the rights of others have a responsibility to
everyone that they knock it off. In a society in which the fortifica-
tionist theory of punishment prevails, we might imagine the judge at
a sentencing tribunal informally chastising an offender as follows:
‘You are under a standing moral requirement, as a fallible person, to
sustain yourself as the kind of person who can be relied upon not to
do wrong – to keep yourself together, morally speaking. Through
your criminal choice, you have demonstrated that you do not have it
together. Get it together’.
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